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Internationalization in Criminal Markets 
 
Abstract 
Using a panel data set, we examine the factors that favor the occurrence of foreign orga-
nized crime and its cooperation with domestic organizations in Italy. By means of an OLS 
regression model, we find that foreigners act independently in regions with bigger migrant 
network and low criminal market concentration. Cooperation is again negatively affected 
by market concentration and appears to positively related to the ratio of immigrant pop-
ulation. A variety of checks show the robustness of our outcome. 
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Organized crime can be defined as groups with formalized structure that threaten peace, 
violate human rights and undermine civil and economic development of societies with the 
primary objective to obtain money through illegal activities (UNODC, 2016; FBI, 2016). 
Modern organized crime can be split up into subversive groups and mafia and non-mafia 
organizations. In spite of ongoing global investigations against the spread of organized 
crime, its dimensions have developed to levels comparable to those of transnational cor-
porations (Williams, 1994). Italian organized crime alone is estimated to have a turnover 
of more than $100 billion per year and is declared as clear threat to the European Union 
(FBI, 2016; Europol, 2013). From a personnel point of view, Italian criminal organizations 
are assessed to have approximately 25,000 members in Italy and about 250,000 affiliates 
spread over Italy, the rest of Europe, the Americas and Australia. Williams (1994) states 
that the emerging openness in the second half of the twentieth century has created un-
precedented opportunities and facilitated the transnational expansion for organized crime. 
The width of businesses that are intertwined with organized crime is enormous and the 
activities range from simple racketeering to the corruption of the highest political institu-
tions. A story of Italian Newspaper La Stampa1 reports of arms deals in trade for antique 
                                                           
1 Quirico, Domenico. 2016. “Arte antica in cambio di armi, affari d’oro in Italia per l’asse fra Isis e ’ndran-




cultural assets between Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta and ISIS, where also Russian and Chinese 
criminal organizations are involved. According to Franco Roberti (2014) the size of the 
impact of transnational organized crime is very likely consequence of a deliberate strategy. 
Criminal organizations are well structured and follow strategies and can thus be compared 
behaviorally to legal corporations and examined by standard tools (Becker, 1968). The 
destructive consequences of organized crime are of tremendous magnitude. Daniele and 
Geys (2015) show that the presence of mafia-related violence causes a lower level of poli-
tician’s human capital and consequently leads to lower quality of institutions and political 
decisions. Thereby, organized crime undermines political structures and the social order 
of countries, which is a challenge to state sovereignty and authority (Shelley, 1995; Wil-
liams, 1994). Related to political quality and the presence of organized crime is the loss of 
economic growth. Foreign investors see crime as a business obstacle and deterring factor 
for investments, affecting both employment and economic development negatively. The 
presence of mafia can be seen as a comparative disadvantage for affected regions (Krkoska 
and Robeck, 2006; Daniele and Marani, 2011). Instead of more profit- and growth-oriented 
private investors, the Italian government is investing in economically weakened regions. 
Pinotti (2012) shows that the substitution of private capital with less productive public 
investment leads to a significant reduction of per capita income. For existing firms, orga-
nized crime is creating significant additional costs: payments for protection, limitation of 
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entrepreneurial potentials, increased cost of credits and distorted loan conditions, destruc-
tion and migration of talent, and unfair competition with mafia-owned legal businesses 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009; Champeyrache, 2015; Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998). According 
to Champeyrache (2000), organized crime’s strategy is long-ranging and opting for a com-
bination of legal and illegal activities. 
The existence of organized crime can be explained by a power vacuum and lacking ultimate 
enforcement, stemming for instance from geographic distance or political change, as it was 
the case in Sicily in the 19th century, where one of the first Italian criminal organizations 
arose (Skaperdas, 2001). The vacuum is replaced by competing gangs, which fight for their 
turfs, where they can use their monopoly power to earn profits through protection money 
and extortion. In the case of Italy, this geographical rivalry used to occur largely in the 
southern regions, where the traditional criminal organizations are based (Mafia in Sicily, 
‘Ndrangheta in Calabria, and Camorra in Campania). 
Over the last decades, Italian criminal organizations have expanded their business activi-
ties within Italy and over the globe. Nonetheless, foreign criminal organizations have man-
aged to develop in Italy and represent additional players in the domestic market. Since 
the beginning of the 1990’s, Italy has noticed a strong increase of immigrants as a conse-
quence of the fall of the Berlin Wall and wars in former Yugoslavia. In spite of a wide-
spread connotation between immigration and crime, Bianchi et al. (2012) found that the 
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overall, not merely organized, crime rate in Italy was not significantly related to the size 
of immigrant population for the period from 1995–2003. Still, it is interesting to examine 
the connection of the level of immigrant population with the presence of foreign criminal 
organizations. In this paper, we want to elaborate an econometric model to test factors 
that favor the presence of foreign organized crime in Italy. A trend that can be observed 
for immigrants’ behavior is that they tend to settle in locations, where people of the same 
national background are more numerous (Bianchi et al., 2012). 
Based on the topics of previous research we want to focus on the occurrence of foreign 
organized crime and the incidence of cooperation between foreigners and Italians through 
an empirical approach. In the following section, we will elaborate the hypotheses for our 
investigation. In section 3, we will present the underlying data for the analysis and describe 
the methodology and the main manipulative operations that were conducted in order to 
run a stable analysis. Section 4 will present the empirical model and the results. Section 
5 will follow with the interpretation of the empirical results for the two dependent varia-
bles and a sample manipulation and variation of dependent variables as robustness checks. 
Section 6 will then sum up the outcomes and give recommendations for future research. 
2 Hypotheses 
As we mentioned before, criminal organizations can be analyzed by standard economic 
tools, which applies also for their choice of market entry. Ghemawat’s (2001) framework 
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to capture distance dimensions between countries delivers a solid explanation for the 
choice of locations with a bigger common population group, where cultural compliance is 
higher through other immigrants. Zaheer (1995) explains this by the “liability of foreign-
ness”, meaning the merely fragmentary information about local rules and behaviors and 
missing legitimacy and trustworthiness to operate in the new market. Thus, it seems log-
ical that firms, in our case illicit firms, are more active in regions with higher migration 
rate. In Italy, the ratio of immigrants is highest in the northern, specifically north-eastern 
regions, which can be explained by the geographic proximity to Balkan States (Del Boca 
and Venturini, 2003) and, relatively to the southern regions, higher income and employ-
ment opportunities. Additionally, a favoring factor for the entry and spreading of foreign 
organized crime in the north is the fact that traditional organizations are less influential 
than in the south. Not to say that northern Italy is not affected by Italian organized crime. 
Yet, it tends to operate even more cautiously to remain undetected outside its territory, 
where political influence might be lower. However, since criminal organizations’ power is 
based on the control of a specific area, the chances for foreigners to enter and succeed are 
higher in the north. Summing up the previous remarks, we may hypothesize that foreign 
organized crime is occurring in areas, where the ratio of immigrants is relatively higher. 
This is due to the reduction of the liability of foreignness and the advantages of an existing 
network of compatriots, which is likely to facilitate the establishment of (illicit) business 
operations. Moreover, we expect foreign criminals to be active in geographical areas, where 
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the criminal activities are not concentrated on one single player, but spread over a multi-
tude of criminal groups. As for legal markets, non-dominant players have less possibilities 
to deter the market entry of a new competitor. Thus, less concentrated markets provide 
more promising opportunities for a successful market entry for foreign groups. In summary, 
we will run the examination taking into account the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Foreign organized crime is (a) significantly and positively related 
with the share of immigrants in a geographical area and (b) shows a significant 
negative correlation with the level of concentration within a criminal market. 
As previously mentioned, Italian organized crime is known to collaborate with other in-
ternational groups (Quirico, 2016; FBI, 2016). This collaboration occurs on an interna-
tional level, but also within the Italian borders. Since we examine the behavior of foreign 
criminal groups in Italy, it is also interesting to have a look at possible factors that may 
foster cooperation between Italian and foreign criminal groups in Italy. Legal firms coop-
erate, when their individual utility of cooperation is higher than in a competitive situation. 
For illicit organizations, we can think of the same incentives. For instance, in a competitive 
market, where individual market shares are low, no single player has the power to increase 
profits. Through collusion with competitors, this status may be evaded. Furthermore, 
previous literature has pointed out that organized crime is based on market power. In less 
concentrated markets, neither foreign nor Italian organizations have a strong power due 
7 
 
to higher market fragmentation and thus a higher number of competitors. As for cooper-
ation between the two groups, we thus would expect a higher cooperation level when 
market concentration is low. For foreign crime alone, we expect a positive connection with 
the level of migration due to migrant network effects. By cooperating with Italian groups, 
foreigners can replace this network effectively and skip the liability of foreignness. Hence, 
other than for foreign crime, we expect cooperative operations not to be correlated with 
the level of migrants. Finally, for cooperation we come up with 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign and Italian organizations’ cooperation is (a) not significantly 
related with the share of immigrants in a geographical area and (b) shows a signif-
icant negative correlation with the level of concentration within a criminal market. 
3 Methodology 
For the examination of our hypotheses on the two sorts of crime, we have assembled data 
on crime for 101 Italian provinces during the period 2007 – 20102. The underlying data 
about organized criminal activity was taken from the Italian anti-mafia investigative au-
thority (Direzione investigativa antimafia [DIA]), which is documenting organized-crime 
related felonies and releasing a report biannually. The used documents contain single op-
                                                           
2 In 2009 and the following year, five new provinces were created by secession. In order to maintain a con-
sistent classification, we attribute the new provinces to the original layout. 
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erations and the associated information about location and type of crime, clan involve-
ment, and number and nationality of the accused. Thereby, Aquilante and Maretto (2016) 
have obtained a dataset with 1857 operations and dummy variables for the previously 
mentioned information. With the underlying information about the accused’ nationalities, 
we were able to create dummies to classify the involved parties into home groups, account-
ing for involved Italians, and foreign groups, accounting for involved foreigners. A dummy 
variable for cooperation was generated to indicate operations with contemporaneous in-
volvement of both groups. For observations, where either only home or only foreign indi-
viduals were involved, we created another specific dummy. The variables are denoted hg, 
hg_only, fg, fg_only and coop, respectively. In addition, the previous five dummies were 
multiplied with the number of involved persons per operation in order to obtain an indi-
cator for the size of an operation. Corresponding to the underlying dummies, the variables 
are denoted hg_pers, hg_o_pers, fg_pers, fg_o_pers and coop_pers. 
Furthermore, socioeconomic and demographic data was gathered from the Italian National 
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and included in the dataset. Specifically, we gathered data 
about population, surface and GDP for every Italian region and province for the respective 
period, which was then used to calculate the population density and GDP per capita, 
which are likely to have an impact on the choice of location of foreigners. The former is 
supposed to capture urban areas, where, by trend, criminal activity is elevated (Glaeser 
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and Sacerdote, 1999). Per capita income is an indicator of wealth as well as for the earning 
opportunities for migrants. Since we expect the level of migration to have an influence on 
the activity of foreign criminal organizations, we want to get an idea of the level of mi-
gration in the 20 regions of Italy and whether it has any influence on foreign organized 
crime. Thus, we have assembled data of residence permits over population for every prov-
ince (ISTAT, 2016), but only for strangers of the nationalities that are explicitly used in 
the DIA documents. Please refer to Appendix A for a full list of nationalities. Finally, the 
dataset contains regional and provincial dummies to account for region- or province-spe-
cific factors. 
The dataset with 1857 single operations was collapsed to a panel dataset with a province-
year-structure. Criminal operations were summed up and divided by the respective prov-
ince population in order to obtain a comparable variable for different regions. The socio-
economic variables were kept identical according to the underlying province and year. 
Thereby, we have obtained a set of 404 observations. A panel structure of the data was 
chosen intentionally in order to deal with the problem of underreporting of criminal ac-
tivity. Since criminal activities are off the record and cannot be documented entirely, the 
given DIA information on crime is only a subsample of total organized crime. It could be 
that there is a bias in our econometric estimates deriving from a correlation between the 
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determinants of criminal activity and the extent of underreporting. By using a panel struc-
ture to include two-way-fixed effects for geographical areas and years, we can bowdlerize 
constant measurement errors over time or across areas. Including fixed effects, and taking 
the logarithm of each variable, the observed data can then be used as an approximation 
for the true values (Ehrlich, 1996). The same approach applies also for migration data, 
where only official immigrants are reported, and specific characteristics of illegals could 
bias the estimates. Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2012) show that there are significant differ-
ences in criminal activity of immigrants depending on their legal status. For both condi-
tions, there are ambiguous effects. Theoretically, illegal immigrants face lower opportunity 
cost of crime due to fewer legitimate income opportunities and non-existent job protection 
for clandestine employment, whereas expulsion may deter criminal activity. Legal immi-
grants, on the other hand, have better labor market outcomes, but face a lower risk of 
expulsion from the country and thus lower opportunity cost of crime. Nevertheless, Bian-
chi et al. (2012) show that logarithms for both dependent and explanatory variables and 
fixed effects are effective to remove the induced measurement error. As for fixed effects, 
the regional fixed effects will be used in the regression due to the relatively short time 
frame of observations and thus small variations within provinces. As mentioned in the 
second section of this paper, we expect the competition level in criminal markets to affect 
the activities of foreigners. To measure the market concentration, we have generated an 
index that is comparable to the Herfindahl Hirshman index. Since we cannot measure 
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market shares of players in a specific criminal market, we have taken the number of ar-
rested persons of each organization over all persons arrested in each observation. The 
resulting ratio of persons for each involved organization is used as a proxy for market 
share. The index is denoted HH, which ranges from zero, in case of perfect competition, 
to one for the case of only one player (comparable to a monopoly situation).  
A condition for the construction of HH is a positive count of arrested persons, otherwise 
the index is not defined. This can be the case for police operations without arrest or for 
province-year-combinations in which no crime was detected. Within the dataset, we have 
noticed a zero count of persons in 83 out of 404 cases, corresponding to one fifth of the 
data. Hence, there are many empty observations, for which the factor “market concentra-
tion” cannot be applied arithmetically. However, assuming a value of zero for HH in those 
cases would bias the results of the regression since we would obtain a high concentration 
of data points at the origin of zero. We could alternatively create a competition indicator 
based on the count of operations instead of persons. However, we would obtain a critical 
mechanical correlation between the count of operations and the level of concentration. 
Such an indicator would be equal to zero for observations without detected crime and, 
more importantly, equal to one in cases, where only one operation took place and only one 
organization was involved. In case of cooperation though, there have to be at least two 
involved parties per operation, which results in the impossibility for HH to be equal to 
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one. This discontinuity of HH would dramatically amplify the negative effect of underre-
porting and measurement errors. By using a person-based indicator, we reduce the number 
of cases in which cooperation is deterministically reducing the level of market concentra-
tion and thus mitigate the described mechanical difficulty and negative effects. We have 
therefore decided to drop the mentioned cases and run our model with 321 observations, 
for which a count of arrested persons is available. By dropping observations from the 
dataset, we consciously condone a selection bias. As alternative measure, we will present 
the results of model with an assumed market concentration value that is equal to the 
average of the 321 given HH. 
4 Model description 
In order to capture the effect of market concentration and migration on criminal activity 
of foreigners and their behavior to cooperate, we are going to use an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model. As controls for the coefficients, we are including fixed effects for the twenty 
Italian regions and for the four years of observation. Additionally, we are taking into 
account the socioeconomic factors that were presented in the previous section. Hence, our 
main estimating equation is 
=  + + + + + ,       (1) 
where  is the log of either foreign crimes or crimes, where cooperation between 
home and foreign groups took place, in region i during year t. The same notation applies 
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for the logged market concentration , and the logged migration rate .  rep-
resents our set of control variables, namely the logarithms of population density and per 
capita income.   and  are region and year fixed effects as control for unobserved factors 
that do not vary within areas or years, and  is an error term. We have run a Breusch-
Pagan test for heteroscedasticity, which came out positively. Therefore, we will use robust 
variance estimators when running the OLS regressions. Our main interest is to identify 
the β coefficients for the different crime operators. 
5 Model evaluation 
In the following section, we describe the regression outputs of our model and their impli-
cations. Moreover, we run some simple methods to control the robustness of our results.  
 5.1 Foreign Crime 
After having rejected the distorting empty observations for HH, we want to analyze the 
effect of the explanatory variables on the occurrence of foreign crime. As previous litera-
ture elaborated, foreign crime tends to occur primarily in areas, where the level of migra-
tion is relatively higher. Furthermore, we have learned that the power of criminal organi-
zations is based on criminal market control within an area. Hence, according to Hypothesis 
1 we would expect a significant positive correlation between foreign organized crime and 
the immigration level, and a negative relationship with the regional level of competition. 
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Table 1 reports the output of an OLS regression with regional and year fixed effects on 
the count of foreign crime in columns (1)-(3) and on the number of involved persons in 
columns (4)-(6). The coefficients for every variable are consistent throughout different 
specifications. The estimators suggest that the number of foreign organized crime is sig-
nificantly related to the occurrence of immigrants in the population. In accordance to 
previous studies, the results suggest that foreign groups do business in areas with a net-
work of immigrants, where the liabilities of foreignness are lower. With a ten percent 
increase of the rate of immigrants, the number of foreign organized crimes increases by 
0.9 percent. Furthermore, the hypothesis that foreigners are more active in regions with 
low market concentration is underpinned by the significant negative coefficients of HH. 
This behavior may be explained by foreigners’ tendency to settle in northern Italy, where 
Italian organizations do not have monopolistic power and the market competition level is 
higher. However, it could also be the case that foreigners work on behalf of Italian organ-
izations in the areas, where the latter are not sufficiently present but still want to pene-







Table 1: Regression output for foreign organized crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES fg_only fg_only fg_only fg_o_pers fg_o_pers fg_o_pers 
       
migr 0.0876***  0.132*** 0.185***  0.255*** 
 (0.0207)  (0.0486) (0.0368)  (0.0850) 
HH  -0.00381*** -0.00322***  -0.0103*** -0.00913*** 
  (0.000995) (0.001000)  (0.00252) (0.00245) 
Constant -0.0108 -0.00112 0.00337 -0.0275 0.00629 0.0150 
 (0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0286) (0.0330) (0.0330) 
Observations 404 321 321 404 321 321 
R-squared 0.324 0.254 0.347 0.304 0.265 0.335 
GDP yes yes yes yes yes yes 
popdens yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5.2 Cooperative Criminal Operations 
Other than for foreigners alone, the impact of the level of migration on cooperative oper-
ations is expected to be insignificant, because through cooperation, the obstacles of for-
eignness may be skirted. Regarding the account of market concentration, we have elabo-
rated the hypothesis that a low concentration incentivizes the two criminal groups to 
cooperate in order to gain market power and generate higher profits. Thus, a significant 
negative correlation between the count of cooperation-crime and HH is expected. The 
output for the regressions on the occurrence of cooperation between home and foreign 
criminal organizations is presented in Table 2. In section 3 we have briefly described the 
complex of problems with an operation-based HH in case of cooperation and how it would 
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mechanically lead to lower concentration values for cooperative crimes. However, the re-
sults lie in a similar scope in the two tables. 
Table 2: Regression output for cooperation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES coop coop coop coop_pers coop_pers coop_pers 
       
migr 0.0525***  0.0225 0.137***  0.0577 
 (0.00926)  (0.0189) (0.0244)  (0.0503) 
HH  -0.00543*** -0.00533***  -0.0148*** -0.0146*** 
  (0.000714) (0.000705)  (0.00194) (0.00192) 
Constant 0.0100 0.0377*** 0.0385*** 0.0308 0.117*** 0.119*** 
 (0.00794) (0.00924) (0.00911) (0.0206) (0.0243) (0.0240) 
Observations 404 321 321 404 321 321 
R-squared 0.287 0.388 0.394 0.266 0.362 0.368 
GDP yes yes yes yes yes yes 
popdens yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Other than expected, the estimator for migr suggests a significant positive impact on the 
incidence of crimes with cooperation. Hence, it appears that cooperation happens in areas 
with higher migrant level and is not a way for foreigners to substitute their migrant net-
work in areas, where the ratio of immigrants is lower. In addition, there are reasonable 
illustrations for the positive correlation. For instance, Italian organizations could force 
foreigners into cooperation by threat of violence in cases where the latter could actually 
operate efficiently on their own (Aquilante and Maretto, 2016). Moreover, foreigners, even 
with existent migrant network, could deliberately choose to cooperate with Italians in 
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order to partake in an Italian organization’s network for reasons such as logistics. As for 
HH, market concentration appears to be a better fitting explanatory factor for cooperative 
operation, as suggested by the considerably higher value of R². The coefficient, however, 
suggests more cooperative criminal operations in areas with a more fragmented criminal 
market. Hence, the output reinforces our hypothesis that a higher competition level is 
driving cooperation between Italians and foreigners. One evident reason is the lack of 
sufficient market power of the individual organizations to effectively penetrate a geograph-
ical area. On the other hand, it could be the case that Italian organizations force foreigners 
into cooperation, as mentioned above.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
After interpreting the results of our regressions, it is advisable to check for the robustness 
of our model in order to exclude unsoundness of our estimates. In avoidance of difficulties 
due to heteroskedascticity, we have used robust standard errors. Fixed effects were used 
to account for region- and year-specific factors. In this subsection, we want to proceed 
with further checks. 
As a first measure to check the robustness of our results, we have run the same regressions 
with two different dependent variables. Instead of the count of criminal operations, we 
have taken the number of arrested people in each observation. By this variation, we can 
easily control for the validity of our estimation. For foreign organized crime, the previously 
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described outcome is robust to the control with the count of persons, as the three right 
regressions in Table 1 report quite similar coefficients and significance levels. It is notice-
able that the magnitudes of migration and market concentration are bigger for involved 
persons than for the mere number of operations. For involved foreigners, the results por-
tend a 1.9 percent higher count of persons with an increase of immigrants by ten percent3. 
As for cooperative crime operations, Table 2 reports only small disparities between the 
results, indicating robustness of our results. 
In Section 3 we have shown the non-applicability of HH for operations, for which no 
number of arrested persons was given and indicated a selection bias after dropping the 
affected observations. In order to verify the methodology, we have taken the mean value 
of HH of all observations with available person counter and inserted it for the 83 cases, 
where HH was not defined. Thereby, we avoid turning points in the distribution of our 
sample. Table 5 and Table 6 present the regression outputs with , the manipulated 
market concentration indicator. For both foreign organized and cooperative crime, the fact 
that the signs and significance levels are congruent affirms robustness of our results. 
                                                           
3 This may suggest that foreigners conduct bigger operations in areas where immigration is high. We have 
checked the dataset with every operation listed separately and detected a non-significant positive correla-
tion in the data for the count of crime-involved foreigners and the level of migration. 
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With respect to the mechanical correlation between HH and the count of operations, we 
have additionally run a regression with another manipulated sample. In addition to drop-
ping the empty observations of persons, we have also cut the observations, where HH is 
equal to one, implying that no cooperation occurred. Moreover, we have generated another 
manipulated HH that contains only exclusive foreign- and home-group operations (denoted 
HH_only) and have run the regression on cooperative crime with it, resulting in similar 
results, confirming robustness to our model. Please refer to Table 7 and Table 8 in Ap-
pendix B to see the outputs. 
6 Conclusion 
We have found that foreign criminal organizations operate in regions, where Italian groups 
do not have outright market control. Furthermore, the network of other migrants appears 
to be an important factor for the local choice of market activity when foreigners work 
independently. In case of cooperation, we have discovered that organizations collaborate 
rather in areas with more migrant population and foreigners cannot substitute their mi-
grant network by collaborating with Italian groups. Moreover, a higher market competi-
tion tends to incentivize both Italians and foreigners to collude.  
Future research could elaborate an alternative measure to incorporate market concentra-
tion without selection bias. Moreover, since it is plausible that cooperation can originate 
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from both foreign and Italian groups, an approach to detect which side is effectively lead-
ing the association could create valuable insights in criminal organizations’ strategies. 
Aquilante and Maretto (2016) have shown that Italians especially cooperate in businesses, 
where foreigners possess an input-based advantage (e.g. counterfeiting). Based on these 
findings, it could be of value to examine whether this specialization is also driven by other 
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Variables: Definitions and Sources 
fg_only: logarithm of the count of operations, where exclusively foreign criminal organi-
zations are involved over the total province population. Source: Direzione Investigativa 
Antimafia 
fg_o_pers: logarithm of the count of arrested persons due to operations, where exclusively 
foreign criminal organizations are involved over the total province population. Source: 
Direzione Investigativa Antimafia 
coop: logarithm of the count of operations, where both Italian and foreign criminal organ-
izations are involved over the total province population. Source: Direzione Investigativa 
Antimafia 
coop_pers: logarithm of the count of arrested persons due to operations, where both Ital-
ian and foreign criminal organizations are involved over the total province population. 
Source: Direzione Investigativa Antimafia 
migr: logarithm of residence permits divided by the total province population, as of De-
cember 31 of each year. Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics. 
HH: concentration in criminal markets. This variable is constructed as follows. First, the 
relative share of each criminal group’s involvement per operation was calculated by 
divding the counter of persons by the number of involved groups. Then, in the panel 
dataset, the sum of shares was divided by the number of operations. The shares were 
raised to the second power and all summed up. Finally, the logarithm of the sum of 
squared relative shares of involvement in criminal operations was taken. Source: Direzione 
Investigativa Antimafia, own calculation. 
GDP: logarithm of real gross domestic product per capita in each province and year. 
Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics. 
popdens: logarithm of the province population over the province’s surface. Source: Italian 
National Institute of Statistics 
Countries included in construction of the migration variable: Albania, Bulgaria, 
China, Nigeria, Romania. Summarizing variables for North Africa, South America, Former 
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Yugoslavia and Former Soviet Union. In accordance to the documentation of Direzione 
Investigativa Antimafia 
Appendix B 
Table 3: Summary statistics, with trimmed sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fg_only 321 0.0022 0.0037 0 0.0336 
fg_only_pers 321 0.0048 0.0082 0 0.0771 
coop 321 0.0018 0.0024 0 0.0136 
coop_pers 321 0.0046 0.0064 0 0.0346 
migr 321 0.0288 0.0143 0.0030 0.0997 
HH 321 0.4921 0.1792 0 0.6932 
GDP 321 9.9668 0.2738 9.3840 10.6054 
popdens 321 11.5187 1.8846 5.5111 14.7755 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix of all variables, with trimmed sample 
 Fg_only Fg_o_pers Coop Coop_pers Migr HH GDP popdens 
Fg_only 1        
Fg_o_pers 0.9181 1       
Coop 0.1101 0.0503 1      
Coop_pers 0.0923 0.0224 0.9501 1     
migr 0.3438 0.2925 0.3115 0.2678 1    
HH -0.2257 -0.2400 -0.3985 -0.3797 -0.2913 1   
GDP 0.2211 0.2305 0.1866 0.1469 0.6755 -0.4149 1  





Table 5: Regression output for foreign organized crime, with manipulated HH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES fg_only fg_only fg_only fg_o_pers fg_o_pers fg_o_pers 
       
migr 0.0876***  0.107*** 0.185***  0.193*** 
 (0.0207)  (0.0368) (0.0368)  (0.0661) 
HH  -0.00508*** 0.00241  -0.0126*** 0.000950 
  (0.000816) (0.00236)  (0.00172) (0.00439) 
Constant -0.0108 -0.0171 -0.0122 -0.0275 -0.0368 -0.0281 
 (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0286) 
Observations 404 404 404 404 404 404 
R-squared 0.324 0.245 0.328 0.304 0.250 0.304 
GDP yes yes yes yes yes yes 
popdens yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Regression output for cooperation, with manipulated HH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES coop coop coop coop_pers coop_pers coop_pers 
       
migr 0.0525***  0.0356** 0.137***  0.0711* 
 (0.00926)  (0.0163) (0.0244)  (0.0388) 
HH  -0.00465*** -0.00214*  -0.0133*** -0.00833*** 
  (0.000574) (0.00127)  (0.00145) (0.00293) 
Constant 0.0100 0.00972 0.0113 0.0308 0.0326 0.0358* 
 (0.00794) (0.00818) (0.00796) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0204) 
Observations 404 404 404 404 404 404 
R-squared 0.287 0.275 0.295 0.266 0.272 0.284 
GDP yes yes yes yes yes yes 
popdens yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Regression on cooperation, with perfect market concentration dropped 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES coop coop_pers 
   
HH -0.00388*** -0.00972*** 
 (0.00106) (0.00283) 
Constant 0.00391*** 0.00999*** 
 (0.000514) (0.00133) 
Observations 228 228 
R-squared 0.051 0.044 
GDP yes yes 
popdens yes yes 
Region FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8: Regressions on cooperation, with HH limited to exclusive foreign- and home operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES coop coop coop_pers coop_pers 
     
migr  0.0218  0.0612 
  (0.0206)  (0.0546) 
HH_only -0.00419*** -0.00388** -0.00880** -0.00794** 
 (0.00153) (0.00151) (0.00392) (0.00391) 
Constant 0.0149 0.0152 0.0474* 0.0480* 
 (0.00968) (0.00964) (0.0257) (0.0256) 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
R-squared 0.299 0.306 0.239 0.247 
GDP yes yes yes yes 
popdens yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
